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1 Introduction
Developing countries usually have scarce resources and low tax revenues. In order to fulfill the
gap between the expenditures and revenues or to overcome the budget deficit, they have to rely
on the foreign capital. However the efficiency of foreign capital depends on governance and the
institutional quality [Agnor and Montiel (2010)]. Good governance enables a country to achieve
its development goals and become prosperous, by establishing a conductive environment for the
high and sustainable economic growth. Good governance establishes an impartial, predictable and
consistently enforced rules in the form of institutions and is thus crucial for the sustained growth
[North (1990, 1992)]. Whereas, many studies have been conducted in recent years to examine
the relationship between economic growth and external debt; economic development and foreign
aid; impact of foreign aid on governance and institutional quality; the role of institution in the
economic performance of country; but little attention has been paid to explore the inter-linkages
among foreign aid, external debt, governance and economic growth in a unified framework.
Theoretically high level of foreign aid can result in favorable as well as unfavorable impact on
the quality of governance. On the one hand, foreign aid enables governments to focus on enforcing
rules of law, fighting against corruption and terrorism effectively by releasing them from binding
revenue constraint [see for example, Nasir et al., (2012), Easterly (2003), Islam (2003), Svensson,
(2000a) and Dollar and Pritchett (1998)]. High foreign aid inflows with clear development plans can
be used to improve rule of law, the quality of civil services, central institutions, policy and planning
capacity as the case of Taiwan and South Korea in the East Asia are good example in this respect
[see for instance, Rodrik, et al., (2004), Rodrik (1996) and Carlsson, et al., (1997)]. But on the other
hand, high level of foreign aid can block or delay essential reforms that can improve governance
quality due to rent seeking and moral hazard problems, the poaching of qualified government staff
members for aid projects, as donors organizations by paying higher salaries hire away the skilled and
efficient public officials, can result in a deterioration of governance [see discussion within, Svensson
(2000b) and Rijckeghem and Weder (1997)].
Similarly recent studies of foreign aid and economic growth have found that foreign aid has
a positive and significant impact, when given to those countries that have good macroeconomic
policies and sound institutions.1 Foreign aid contributes in enhancing the economic development;
positive levels of economic growth can generate tax revenues and effective management, leading to
good governance. All these factors help to improve investment climate leading to more economic
activity which in turn contribute additional revenues and improvement in the credit worthiness of
government, eventually helping to improve government quality.
On the contrary, however, foreign aid may dampen the incentive for greater resource mobiliza-
tion through taxation leading to a decline in government revenues, also goods imported by foreign
aid projects are often exempted from import duties. Personnel working for foreign aid agencies
and NGOs rarely pay local income taxes [Berg (1993)]. External resources can reduce pressure on
recipient governments to set up the efficient institutions and policies, essential in order to attract
private investment that promote the economic growth [Rodrik (1996: pp. 31)].
Foreign assistance can even accentuate political instability in situation where the government
tends to grab the aid money and neglects economic development leading to political pressure and
general unrest in the masses. Political scientists have argued that aid weakens legislative account-
ability, by impeding the growth of well ”civil society” hurting the rule of law and democracy.
Foreign aid in developing countries may decrease the government’s dependence on its citizens for
tax revenues. With high level of foreign aid, recipient governments are answerable mainly to foreign
1Summarized review of selected empirical studies is provided in Table A1.
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donors rather than the tax payer, in this way the sovereignty of the country is also compromised,
as the donors play influential role that may not be a good thing because the donors actually do not
know exactly the system of the recipient country.
Lack of domestic capital compels the government to look for additional financial resources,
so it is supplemented by funds from abroad in order to accelerate the investment activities and
the economic growth. Many development economists are of the view that capital is essential for
economic growth and it does not matter from where it is financed. But the impact of external debt
on the economic growth is controversial, in the literature their exist different hypothesis including
the Liquidity Constraint Hypothesis (LCH), Debt Overhang Hypothesis (DOH), Direct Effect of
Debt Hypothesis (DEDH) and uncertainty.
The Debt Overhang Hypothesis states that high level of current debt worsens the economic
performance because it leads to an increase in the future tax on the output that alters the indi-
viduals’ incentive to save and invest [Krugman (1988), Corden (1988), Sachs (1989), Froot (1989)].
The DOH reduces the incentives to invest in new technologies and the human capital, it also makes
government not to invest in the activities like structural reforms and fiscal adjustments [Sachs,
2002)].The Liquidity Constraint Hypothesis states that in case of highly indebted countries the
debt service payments are so high which reduce the funds available for investment [Hoffman and
Reisen(1991)].
In order to check the impact of external debt on investment and savings DOH and LCH has
been tested empirically. Some studies are in favor of DOH while other supports the LCH; by and
large the results are mixed. Cordello et al. (2005), Faini and DeMelo (1990) and Fry (1989) provide
evidences that supports DOH and conclude that highly indebted countries experience low rates of
capital formation and the debt affects investment negatively. Hoffman and Reisen (1991), Cohen
(1993), Clements et al. (2003), Hansen (2004) and Presbitero (2005) find little empirical evidence
in favor of DOH, they conclude on the basis of their findings that the high debt service payments
crowd out the investment and hence negatively affect the economic growth.
Uncertainty is another factor associated with the external debt; it makes the inflation and inter-
est rates more volatile that affect the economic performance through the volatility in investment.
Future capital inflows also depend on the perceived sustainability, risk of default, rescheduling of
debt payments and outstanding debt that increase the volatility of future lending Gunning and
Mash, (1999). The short term debt and macroeconomic instability diminish the efficiency and
productivity of capital that in turn reduce the economic growth [Moss and Chiang, (2003)].
High level of external debt and debt service payments are deleterious for investment as on
the one hand they induce high tax rates on future output while on the other hand high debt
service payments decrease the funds required for investment. DEDH states that even if the debt
service payment does not adversely affect investment and saving it may decline the output growth
directly through diminishing productivity due to adverse change in investment mix. DOH, LCH,
and uncertainty imply a negative impact of foreign borrowing on investment level that leads to a
decline in the economic growth, but the DEDH on the other hand states that debt burden may
influence the efficiency and productivity of existing capital even if it does not affect investment. In
this way it will influence the output level and the economic growth [Fosu (1996)].
Motivating from these direct/indirect channels, this study develops a theoretical model in which
exclusive attention has been paid to explore the impact of foreign aid and external debt on economic
growth by taking into consideration the governance quality. Specifically, our attempt tries to extend
the Ramsey-Cass-Koopman model in an open economy framework by incorporating the foreign aid,
external debt and governance quality. The main results are: external debt and foreign aid do not
affect the growth rate of consumption but have level impact on consumption. Foreign aid and
governance encourage the economic growth but external debt creates a burden on the economy.
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Both Investment and saving are independent of external debt and thus the current account surplus.
Foreign aid does not affect investment directly but it has a direct positive impact on the savings
in the economy. Improvements in the quality of governance actually stimulate the output and
consumption rapidly and it acts like a catalyst. Lastly, steady state dynamics (stability properties
around the saddle-path) of output, governance, debt, consumption, capital and investment have
been discussed in detail.
The paper follows with the description of theoretical model. The third section discusses steady-
state and short-run dynamics and last section concludes the main results.
2 The Model
The standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth2 model assumes infinite time horizon; while mak-
ing decision regarding consumption parents take into account the welfare of their coming genera-
tions. Parents maximize their utility by taking into consideration the budget constraint over an
infinite horizon. The basic model assumes that all the household units are identical; each family
unit has similar preference parameters, assets per person, marginal product of labor, population
growth rate but in the present case constant population and all variables in per capita term has
been considered. It also assumes that the markets are perfectly competitive, homogeneous agents
receive wage in return of their services while the capital that owned by the households receives
rent. For simplicity it is assumed that there is no depreciation. Obstfeld (1999) adds foreign aid
in Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model while Xiaoyong and Gong (2008) also worked on the foreign aid
and external debt and find out the short run and long run impact of foreign aid on the capital
accumulation and the external debt. Following the basic framework used by the Blancherd and
fischer (1989) here we extend the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model by incorporating foreign aid and
governance in an open economy. Production function is purely neoclassical and fulfills all the basic
properties. We consider the technological progress as neutral, following the definition of Harrod
(Harrod-neutral) and the labor augmented production function specified by Robenson (1938) and
Uzawa (1961).
Production in the domestic economy takes place with three inputs: physical capital K(t), labour
L(t), and technology Θ(t) which depends on the quality of governance, Q(t)3 and can be expressed
as: Θ(t) = Θ(0).eQ(t)+n. The parameter ′n′ is exogenous rate of technological progress. The
production function then takes of the form: Y (t) = F [K(t),Θ(t).L(t)]. Where, Y (t) is the flow of
output produced at time t. The intensive form of the production function is given as:
y(t) = f(k(t)) (1)
Where, f : R+ → R+ is twice continuously differential, with the following Inada-conditions:
f ′(k(t)) > 0, f ′′(k(t)) < 0, ∀ k(t) > 0
limit
k(t)→0
f ′(k(t)) =∞, limit
k(t)→∞
f ′(k(t)) = 0, f(0) = 0.
2The original attempts made by Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) in a spirit to make saving
behavior endogenous. This resolves the problem of dynamic inefficiency, which emerged in the Solow-Swan growth
model under the adhoc assumption of savings as exogenous, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
3Following, Hall and Jones (1999) and North (1990), good governance is defined in terms of institutional credibility,
effective laws/regulations and infrastructure stability which favors production process.
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Household’s utility function can be expressed as:
U =
∫ ∞
0
U(C(t))e−θtdt (2)
Where, C(t), is the consumption of the household, U(.) is the instantaneous utility function
that is nonnegative increasing, concave and twice differentiable, i.e., U ′(.) > 0 and U ′′(.) 6 0. The
parameter θ represents the subjective discount rate that is assumed to be strictly nonnegative,
θ(0, 1).
In case of an open economy the equality between the saving and investment does not hold as
the international trade in goods and assets is allowed. The imbalances in current account can be
financed through the external debt and the country can borrow and lend freely at the constant
world interest rate θ.4 From national income identity:
f(k(t)) ≡ C(t) + dk(t)
dt
+G(t) +NX(t) (3)
NX(t) is the net export, C(t) is the private consumption expenditure, while dk(t)/dt represents
the change in capital stock that is actually investment at time ′t′. Here the government expenditure,
G(t) has been sub-divided into the expenditure on governance, Z(t) and expenditures on public
goods, G(0).
f(k(t)) ≡ C(t) + dk(t)
dt
+ Z(t) +G(0) +NX(t) (4)
We can define, g(t) the effective governance as percent of output. This can be thought of
governance multiplier as:
Z(t) = g(t)f(k(t)) (5)
The equation of motion of capital stock takes of the following form:
dk(t)
dt
= I(t) = i(t)
[
1 + T
(
i(t)
k(t)
)]
(6)
Where i(t)T (.) is the cost of installation. In order to increase the capital stock by i units, firm
has to face the cost that is equal to i(t)T (.). The installation cost function [i(t)/k(t)]T (.) is non
negative and convex as shown in the Figure 1.
When, there is no investment or zero investment, the installation cost function takes its mini-
mum value that is zero. Here investment and disinvestment both are costly:
T (0) = 0, T (.)>0, 2T ′(.) +
1
kT ′′(.)
>0
The solution of (4), (5) and (6) yield the following result:
f(k(t)) ≡ C(t) + i(t)
[
1 + T
(
i(t)
k(t)
)]
+ g(t)f(k(t)) +G(0) +NX(t) (7)
As we know, the current account deficit is equal to the change in external debt, db(t)/dt, which
is equal to the interest payments on dent minus net exports.
4This assumption is similar to Blancherd and fischer (1989).
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Figure 1: Cost of installation for investment
db(t)
dt
= θb(t)−NX(t) (8)
By re-arranging (8), substitute the value of net exports into equation (7) and incorporating the
foreign aid A(t) the final budget constraint is derived as:
f(k(t)) +A(t) = C(t) + i(t)
[
1 + T
(
i(t)
k(t)
)]
+ g(t)f(k(t)) +G(0) + θb(t)− db(t)
dt
(9)
This can be re-written as:
db(t)
dt
= C(t) + i(t)
[
1 + T
(
i(t)
k(t)
)]
+ g(t)f(k(t)) +G(0) + θb(t)− f(k(t))−A(t) (10)
If the country is able to borrow an unlimited amount at the prevailing interest rate, it will
induce Ponzi-Game. So in order to avoid it, the restriction of Non-Ponzi Game has been applied,
i.e.,
Limit
t→∞ b(t)e
−θt = 0 (11)
To solve the underlying optimization problem, the present value Hamiltonian has been used in
which the utility function (2) is maximized subject to budget constraint (10), the capital accumu-
lation equation (6), and the co-state variables, µ(t).e−θ.t and µ(t).q(t)e−θ.t respectively.
H =
[
U(C(t))− µ(t)
{
C(t) + i(t)
[
1 + T ( i(t)k(t))
]
+ g(t)f(k(t))
+G(0) + θb(t)− f(k(t))−A(t)
}
+ µ(t)q(t)i(t)
]
e−θt
The FOC’s are:
∂H
∂C
=
[
U ′(C(t))− µ(t)] e−θt = 0 (12)
∂Ht
∂k
= −µ(t)e−θt
[
−f ′(k(t))− ( i(t)
k(t)
)2T ′(
i(t)
k(t)
) + g(t)f ′(k(t))
]
= 0 (13)
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∂Ht
∂i
= −µ(t)e−θt
[
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
) + (
i(t)
k(t)
)T ′(
i(t)
k(t)
)
]
+ µ(t)q(t)e−θt = 0 (14)
∂Ht
∂g
= −µ(t)f(k(t))e−θt (15)
∂Ht
∂b
= −µ(t)θe−θt (16)
From the above first order conditions, the following results has been derived respectively.
U ′(C(t)) = µ(t) (17)
d(µ(t)q(t)e−θt)
dt
= −µ(t)e−θt
[
(1− g(t))f ′(k(t)) + ( i(t)
k(t)
)2T ′(
i(t)
k(t)
)
]
(18)
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
) + (
i(t)
k(t)
)T ′(
i(t)
k(t)
) = q(t) (19)
d(−µ(t)e−θt)
dt
= µ(t)θe−θt (20)
Equations (18) and (20) are the Euler equations for capital and external debt respectively.
Limit
t→∞ −µ(t)b(t)e
−θt = 0 (21)
Limit
t→∞ µ(t)q(t)k(t)e
−θt = 0 (22)
Equations (21) and (22) are the respective transversality conditions associated with debt and
capital.
2.1 Corollary(i): Behavior of Consumption growth
In order to find out the growth rate of consumption, solve (20) by applying differentiation with
respect to time, t.
−
[
dµ(t)
dt
e−θt − θµ(t)e−θt
]
= µ(t)θe−θt
[
dµ(t)
dt
− θµ(t)
]
e−θt = −µ(t)θe−θt
This simplifies as:
dµ(t)
dt
= 0 (23)
From (17), we have:
U ′(C(t)) = µ(t)
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dU ′(C(t))
dt
=
dµ(t)
dt
= 0
This gives the main result of consumption growth.
C˙(t)
C(t)
= 0 (24)
We can say that the consumption is smooth-over time and it is independent of the rate of time
preference.
2.2 Corollary(ii): Behavior of Consumption at level
In order to find out the level of consumption, integrate the flow constraint (19) using transver-
sality condition (21).
db(t)
dt
= C(t) + i(t)
[
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
)
]
+ gf(k(t)) +G(t) + θb(t)− f(k(t))−A(t)
0 =
∫ ∞
0
[
C(t) + i(t)
(
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
)
)
+ gf(k(t)) +G(t) + θb(t)− f(k(t))−A(t)
]
e−θtdt
∫ ∞
0
C(t) e−θtdt = −
∫ ∞
0
[
i(t)
(
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
)
)
+ gf(k(t)) +G(0)− f(k(t))
]
e−θtdt
−
∫ ∞
0
θb(t)e−θtdt+
∫ ∞
0
A(t) e−θtdt
∫ ∞
0
C(t) e−θtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[
f(k(t))− i(t)
(
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
)
)
− gf(k(t))−G(0)
]
e−θtdt
−
∫ ∞
0
θb(t)e−θtdt+
∫ ∞
0
A(t) e−θtdt (25)
Where, ∫ ∞
0
θb(t)e−θtdt = b(0) as Limit
t→∞ θ b(t) = b(0)∫ ∞
0
A(t)e−θtdt = A(0) as Limit
t→∞ A(t) = A(0)
Using above conditions, equation (25) can be written as:
∫ ∞
0
C(t) e−θtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[
f(k(t))− i(t)
(
1 + T (
i(t)
k(t)
)
)
− gf(k(t))−G(0)
]
e−θtdt− b(0) +A(0)
This can be simplify as:
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∫ ∞
0
C(t) e−θtdt = V (0) (26)
The present discounted value of consumption is equal to net wealth at time zero V (0), the
present discounted value of net output (the contents of the braces and foreign aid minus initial
level of debt). Since consumption is constant above equation implies that:
C(t) = C(0) = θV (0) (27)
2.3 Corollary(iii): Behavior of Investment
Equation (19) indicates that the investment rate is a function of q(t), which is the shadow price
of installed capital in terms of consumption goods. It also implies that:
q(t) = ϑ(
i(t)
k(t)
), ϑ′ ≥ 0 and ϑ(0) = 1
From the above specification, inverse function can be formulated as:
i(t)
k(t)
= ξ(q(t)) ξ′ ≥ 0 and ξ(1) = 0
Put this value in the capital accumulation equation (6) and after replacement, it takes the form
as:
dk(t)
dt
= i(t) = k(t)ξ(q(t)), ξ′ ≥ 0 and ξ(1) = 0 (28)
Capital accumulation (investment) is a function of shadow price q(t), to determine the value of
this price consider equation (18), given (23):
dq(t)
dt
= θq(t)− (1− g(t))f ′2T ′ [ξ(q(t)] (29)
Integrate equation (29) subject to transversality condition (22):
0 =
∫ ∞
t
[
θq(t)− (1− g(t))f ′2T ′ {ξ(q(t))}] e−θtdt
This can be simplify as:
q(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[
(1− g(t))f ′2T ′ {ξ(q(t))}] e−θtdt (30)
The shadow price q(t) is equal to the present discounted value of marginal product. From
equation (30) it becomes clear that investment is independent of the consumption, foreign aid and
debt. As the economy is open so in the presence of exogenous real interest rate investment does
not depend on the savings at all but the most exciting and significant result is that the investment
decision is not independent of Governance expenditures. Whenever marginal propensity to invest
in Governance increases it will encourage more investors to make investment.
2.4 Corollary(iv): Behavior of Saving and Current Account
Saving is given as:
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S(t) = f(k(t))− C(t)− gf(k(t))−G(0)− θb(t) +A(t) (31)
As we know that:
C(t) = θV (t)
By putting the value of consumption in equation (31), we get:
S(t) = f(k(t))−θ
∫ ∞
0
[
f(k(z))− i(z)
(
1 + T (
i(z)
k(z)
)
)]
e−θ(z−t)dz+(1−θ) [A(t)− g(t)f(k(t))−G(0)]
(32)
From the final equation of saving, it becomes clear that whenever output is high compared
to future expected output savings will be high. Savings are not independent of foreign aid; in-
crease in foreign aid will lead to enhance savings positively but governance and public expenditures
affect negatively. The equality of the marginal propensity to consume and interest rate simply im-
plies whenever debt increases it will decrease the income and consumption equally, leaving savings
unaffected.
CAS(t) = S(t)− I(t) (33)
The difference between the savings and investment is known as current account surplus (CAS).
Savings and investment are independent of debt stock and so the current account surplus but foreign
aid affects it positively. Whenever government increase its expenditures either they are related to
governance or other public expenses, it affects the current account surplus negatively.
3 Steady-State and Short Run Dynamics
This section will derive the steady state relations and transitional dynamics of key variables.
Equations (28) and (29) show the dynamics of the economy that determine capital, investment and
output. The consumption level and the dynamics of debt are determined by (27) and (10).
3.1 Capital and Investment
In the steady state we know that:
dk(t)
dt
=
dq(t)
dt
= 0
From equation (28) it becomes clear that whenever ξ(1) = 0, it implies that change in capital
is equal to zero i.e. dk(t)/dt = 0 or when q(t) = 1. So in the steady state:
q∗ = 1
(1− g(t))f ′(k∗) = θ
If we put this steady state value of q(t)∗ and marginal productivity of capital in equation (29),
we find that:
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dk(t)
dt
=
dq(t)
dt
= 0
This equation shows that in the steady state the rate of investment is equal to zero. The shadow
price of capital must be equal to replacement cost while the marginal product of capital is equal to
the discount rate, which is itself equal to the rate of time preference.
To analyze the dynamics of capital and investment around the steady state neighborhood equa-
tions (28) and (29) have been linearized around q∗ = 1 and k∗.From equation (25) we know that:
·
k(t)
k(t) = ξ(q(t)), we can write it as:
·
k(t)
k(t)
=
d ln(k(t))
dt
= ξ(eln(q(t)) = h1(ln(q(t)) (34)
Equation (29) and (34) jointly yields the following result:
·
q(t)
q(t)
= θ − (1− g(t))f
′(k(t))
q(t)
− ξ(q(t))
2T ′ [ξ(q(t)]
q(t)
As we know that:
·
q(t)
q(t)
=
d ln(q(t))
dt
This can solve the above equation as:
d ln(q(t))
dt
= θ− (1−g(t))f ′ ln(k(t)))e− ln(q(t))−ξ(eln q(t))2T ′
[
ξ(eln q(t))
]
e− ln q(t) = h2(ln(k(t), ln(q(t))
(35)
The Taylor series approximation at (k, q) = (k∗, 1) simplifies the above expression as:
h1(ln(q(t)) = h2(ln(k(t), ln(q(t)) = 0
The relevant partial derivatives of the equations (34) and (35) are:
∂h1(ln(q(t))
∂ ln(q(t))
=
∂
[
ξ(eln(q(t))
]
∂ ln(q(t))
= ξ ′ ln(q(t) = ξ ′ · q(t) (36)
∂ [h2(ln(k(t), ln(q(t))]
∂ ln(q(t))
=
∂
{
θ − (1− g(t))f ′ ln(k(t)))e− ln(q(t)) − ξ(eln q(t))2T ′ [ξ(eln q(t))] e− ln q(t)}
∂ ln(q(t))
= (1− g(t))f ′ ln(k(t)))e− ln(q(t)) − ξ ′ ln(q(t)))2T ′
[
ξ(eln(q(t)))
]
eln(q(t)) + ξ (eln(q(t)))2T”
[
ξ ”(eln(q(t)))
]
−ξ (eln(q(t)))2T ′
[
ξ (eln(q(t)))
]
e− ln(q(t))
∂ [h2(ln(k(t), ln(q(t))]
∂ ln(k(t))
=
∂
{
θ − (1− g(t))f ′ ln(k(t)))e− ln(q(t)) − ξ(eln q(t))2T ′ [ξ(eln q(t))] e− ln q(t)}
∂ ln(k(t))
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∂ [h2(ln(k(t), ln(q(t))]
∂ ln(k(t))
= −(1− g(t))f ”e− ln(q(t))
∂ [h2(ln(k(t), ln(q(t))]
∂ ln(k(t))
= −(1− g(t))f ”
q(t)
(37)
By evaluating above expressions at steady state values of capital and shadow prices, we get the
following results respectively:
·
k(t)
k(t)
= ξ ′(1) · ln
(
q
q∗
)
(38)
·
q(t)
q(t)
= (1− g(t))f ′∗) ln
(
q
q∗
)
− (1− g(t))f ” ln
(
k
k∗
)
(39)
The log linearized equation (39) and (40) can be written in the matrix form as:( dk
dt
dq
dt
)
=
(
0 ξ ′∗
−(1− g(t))f ”(k∗) (1− g(t))f ′∗)
) (
k − k∗
q − 1
)
(40)
Figure 2, shows the dynamic behavior of investment and capital graphically using phase dia-
gram, corresponding to (40). The dk(t)/dt = 0 locus shows the dynamics of capital, this line is
horizontal at q∗ = 1, dq(t)/dt = 0 locus is downward sloping. 5
Figure 2: Dynamics of capital and investment
The arrows show the direction of motion, the line SP is the saddle path that is negatively sloped
and indicates a unique path converging to steady state. The saddle path indicates the dynamics
of investment. Let k0 indicates the initial level of capital at which q0 > q
∗ = 1. As the shadow
5The dq(t)/dt = 0 locus is negatively sloped around the neighborhood, whenever the restriction of close neighbor-
hood is violated there is no assurance that away from the steady state it is negatively sloped without the imposition
of further restrictions on the T (.) function. However the restrictions imposed on T (.) are sufficient to ensure the
negative slope of dq(t)/dt = 0 locus around the steady state.
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price is greater than unity, capital accumulates over time. Output increases and so does net output
while investment decreases over time due to diminishing marginal productivity.
3.2 Consumption and Debt
From the Euler equation (24) for consumption it becomes clear that the consumption is smooth
over time and it is independent of the interest rate or the rate of time preference. The consumption
level is constant over time as revealed by the equation (27). The level of consumption depends on
the net output that is defined as:
Net.Output = Total.Output+ Foreign.Aid− Stock.of.Debt− Cost.of.investment (41)
Let the stock of debt and foreign aid be zero initially then from equation 26, the present
discounted value of net output minus consumption must be zero. Alternatively one can say that
the present discounted value of current and future trade surpluses is zero. Figure 3 describes this
fact graphically, the area AA’ODD’ must be divided by horizontal consumption line in such a way
that makes the present value of area AA’O equals to present value of DD′O.
Figure 3: Consumption, net output, trade and current accounts
Net output depends on the changes in capital stock i.e. investment. Let the economy start
somewhere below the steady state level with some initial capital stock ko (see, Figure 2), as the
capital stock increases to its steady state level k∗ , the net output also increases over time (see,
Figure 3). Net income increases from the level below consumption (see point A in Figure 3) and
eventually exceeds consumption (see point O).
In the start net output is less then consumption and this gap will be financed by foreign aid
and debt or by running current account deficit. Debt accumulates in the region AA′O and after
point O net income exceeds the consumption. The area DD′O shows the trade surplus, in steady
state the current account must be balanced. The interest payments on debt offset the trade surplus
θb∗ = DD′O, where b∗ is the steady state level of debt that is positive.
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3.3 Governance and Transitional Dynamics
Governance plays an important role in all the economic activities of a country. Good economic
institutions promote growth by increasing the efficiency of factors of production. Governance
has been taken as exogenous so whenever quality of governance improves it shifts the production
function upward as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Governance and output
Improvement in the quality of governance increases the output for a given level of capital stock.
Investment depends on the output as well as governance, so whenever output increases or the
institutional quality improves it will enhance the investment.
Figure 5: Effect of good governance on capital and investment
Figure 5, shows the dynamics of investment and capital when quality of governance improves.
Governance acts as a shifting parameter and it shift the dq/dt = 0 locus to the right, the dk/dt = 0
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locus does not change its position.
The steady state of the economy shifts from P to P ′, the steady state level of capital also in-
creases from k∗ to k′∗. SP ′ is the new saddle path, due to improvement in the quality of governance
investment increases abruptly from P0 to O as shown in Figure 5. Then in the long run downward
movement along the saddle path takes place from O to P1. Rate of investment is positive but
decreasing over the period of time due to diminishing marginal productivity of capital.
Initially whenever governance improves it enhance productivity, but it will increase consumption
more than the net output due to which the deficit increases but in the long run net output increases
and deficit turns into surplus, as shown in the following Figure 6.
Figure 6: Effect of good governance on Consumption and net output
In the start the deficit was equal to OEC but when consumption level increases it shifts the
consumption curve from C to C ′, now equilibrium shifts from E to E′ and deficit increases by an
area equals to CC ′EE′.
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a model for governance; the Ramsey-Cass-Koopman’s model
has been extended by incorporating governance in an open economy framework. The model yields
the following implications: external debt and foreign aid do not affect the growth rate of consump-
tion but have level impact on consumption. Foreign aid and governance encourage the economic
growth but external debt creates a burden on the economy. Both Investment and saving are in-
dependent of external debt and thus the current account surplus. Foreign aid does not affect
investment directly but it has a direct positive impact on the savings in the economy. Improve-
ments in the quality of governance will stimulate the output and consumption rapidly and it acts
like a catalyst. Steady state and short run dynamics of output, governance, debt, consumption,
capital and investment have been discussed in detail.
On the basis of these results, it is recommended that to achieve elevated economic growth rates;
developing countries must have impartial and consistent set of rules that ensure the preeminent
quality of governance. Good governance is essential and it plays a vital role in determining the
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destination of a country. Most of the developing countries usually have poor governance and it is
the major obstacle that hinders the economic reform and development process.
Foreign aid and external debt are the sources through which developing countries finance their
budget deficit. Foreign aid has a positive impact on economic growth and it is playing a constructive
role in spurring the economic activity of an economy. External debt has a negative impact on
economic growth and its a burden that puts an economy into trouble. It is recommended on the
basis of this study that developing countries should finance budget through foreign aid and not
depend on the external debt as it affects the economic activities adversely. If government pays
more attention to the institutional quality and uses foreign aid effectively then it will have good
impact on economic growth in the long run. Developing countries should try to pay more attention
to the issue of lack of quality governance and side by side they must indulge in those activities that
augment the tax revenues.
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